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Abstract—Deep learning, as widely known, is vulnerable to adversarial samples. This paper focuses on the adversarial attack on
autoencoders. Safety of the autoencoders (AEs) is important because they are widely used as a compression scheme for data storage
and transmission, however, the current autoencoders are easily attacked, i.e., one can slightly modify an input but has totally different
codes. The vulnerability is rooted the sensitivity of the autoencoders and to enhance the robustness, we propose to adopt double
backpropagation (DBP) to secure autoencoder such as VAE and DRAW. We restrict the gradient from the reconstruction image to the
original one so that the autoencoder is not sensitive to trivial perturbation produced by the adversarial attack. After smoothing the gradient
by DBP, we further smooth the label by Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM), aiming for accurate and robust classification. We demonstrate in
MNIST, CelebA, SVHN that our method leads to a robust autoencoder resistant to attack and a robust classifier able for image transition
and immune to adversarial attack if combined with GMM.
Index Terms—double backpropagation, autoencoder, network robustness, GMM.
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1 INTRODUCTION
IN the past few years, deep neural networks have beengreatly developed and successfully used in a vast of fields,
such as pattern recognition, intelligent robots, automatic
control, medicine [1]. Despite the great success, researchers
have found the vulnerability of deep neural networks to
adversarial attacks, which has been a big concern recently
[2]. Briefly speaking, for a well-trained neural network f
that correctly classifies an example x, adversarial attacks
produce a slight and usually invisible perturbation ∆x such
that the output for x + ∆x is different from that of x, which
is incorrect. Mathematically, the above adversarial attack on
the classifier f can be described as the following problem:
find ∆x (1)
s.t. f(x) 6= f(x + ∆x)
‖∆x‖ ≤ .
There have been many discussions about adversarial attack
since its proposal by Szegedy et al. [3], which generates
adversarial examples with the box-constrained L-BFGS
method. The basic idea of (1) is to find a small magnitude of
perturbation to change the output. The intuitive idea is to
search on the direction of gradient, which is the basic idea of
FGSM [3] and BIM (iterative version of FGSM, [4]). Further
improvement comes from embedding geometric information,
e.g., C&W [5], [6], Projected Gradient Descent (PGD, [4]).
The latter is currently regarded as the strongest attack. Many
defense methods are also focusing on the difference between
the original and the adversarial example on image [7], [8],
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feature [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], or network structure [3], [14],
[15].
Adversarial attack and its defense are revolving around a
small ∆x and a big resulting difference between f(x + ∆x)
and f(x). In other words, the existence of adversarial
examples is rooted in large gradients of the output f with
respect to the input x. Since one usually does not care about
df/dx when training neural networks, the gradient could
become unreasonably large and thus draw forth adversarial
attacks. Given this, Drucker and LeCun proposed to restrict
df/dx by minimizing its magnitude via backpropagation,
which is hence named as "double backpropagation" (DBP,
[16]). This idea has been recently revisited by [17] for
enhancing the robustness to adversarial attacks. Although
the basic idea of pursuing small gradients for robustness
sounds promising, DBP has not achieved the expectation for
classification tasks. This is because in classification tasks, the
label y is discontinues, so forcing the neural network to have
small df/dx may lead to f ’s inability to approach y.
In this paper, we are going to use DBP in training
autoencoders. For an autoencoder, the encoder part first
encodes the input into a lower dimensional code z = e(x).
Then the decoder reconstructs the input from the latent code
x′ = d(z). Unlike the discontinuity of labels, the latent space
of an encoder should be continuous with respective to the
input, i.e., if the inputs are similar, their latent representations,
and reconstruction results should be similar.
However, to the best of our knowledge, the existing
autoencoders do not control the magnitude of the dx′/dx,
which leads autoencoders to be easily attacked. The attack
on an autoencoder in output space can be described as the
following,
find ∆x (2)
s.t. ‖d(e(x))− d(e(x + ∆x))‖ ≥ Dd
‖∆x‖ ≤ .
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2where e(·) and d(·) are the encoder and decoder to be
attacked.
Notice that x is a clean example so the distance between
x and its reconstructed output x′ is within a reconstruction
error bound D, i.e., ‖d(e(x)) − x‖ ≤ D. Then according to
the requirement of (2), we could find that the reconstructed
output of adversarial example is different from the input.
Instead, it could resemble another target image or could be
totally meaningless, the former of which is targeted attack
and the latter is non-target. An example of target attack is
shown in top of Fig. 1, where the left gives the original image
and target image and the top-right plots the reconstruction
result of an adversarial example. The attacked autoencoder
is Deep Recurrent Attentive Writer (DRAW) [18] and the
attack is the one proposed by [19]. With this attack, one can
slightly disturb an original input to obtain an adversarial
input, that is similar to the origin but its reconstruction is
totally different.
Fig. 1: An example of adversarial attack on DRAW. The
left column shows attack target (from "1" to "0"). The
adversarial example of AE (DRAW) and the reconstruction
results are shown in the top line. The adversarial example
looks like the original "1", however, after encoding and
decoding, the reconstruction result, shown in the top right,
becomes to another digit "0". The bottom line shows the
performance of DBP. For the same model and the same
attack, the reconstruction result of the adversarial example
still resembles digit "1".
The autoencoders’ safety is of great importance, because
they are widely used as compression schemes for data
storage and transmission. Given that the attack results from
the large gradients of autoencoders, we propose to use DBP
to control the gradient and improve their robustness to
adversarial attacks.
Therefore we propose to train an autoencoder by min-
imizing the reconstruction loss, the KL-divergence, as the
existing training process, and the magnitude of the gradients.
By training with DBP, an autoencoder with small dx′/dx
could be obtained, which prevents a slight perturbation on
x to lead significant difference on the latent space and the
reconstruction result. For the previous example shown in Fig.
1, when we training DRAW with DBP, the attack fails, i.e.,
the reconstruction result resembles the input.
The above describes the basic idea training autoencoders
by DBP. In the following sections, we specifically train DBP
autoencoders in the framework of Variational Autoencoder
(VAE) [20], [21] and DRAW. The experiments are on MNIST
[22] and CelebA [23] dataset and AUDDC is used to measure
their robustness. Comparison results show that autoencoder
trained with DBP is more robust against adversarial attacks,
in both visual effect and quantitative measurements.
Via training with DBP, we can obtain an autoencoder with
controllable gradients dz/dx and dx′/dx. According to that,
we further design a distribution estimator based on GMM,
which attempts to reconstruct continuous probability p from
discrete labels y. This procedure also could be regarded as
label smoothing [24], [25], [26], [27], [28]. In the proposed
GMM, dp/dz is kept small and its cooperation with an
encoder trained by DBP leads to a classifier with reasonable
gradients from the output to the input, which is hence robust
to attacks. A prominent example is that going alone the
obtained classifier, one could transfer the images rather
than generate adversarial examples which is an example
for application of double backpropagation.
The remaining parts of the paper are organized as
follows. In Section II, we give a brief review of autoencoders
and describe their vulnerability under adversarial attacks.
Section III describes the design of double backpropagation
for autoencoders. Section IV discusses the cooperation of
autoencoder with DBP and GMM. Experiments that validate
the robustness of the proposed DBP are given in Section V.
Section VI concludes the paper briefly.
2 AUTOENCODER AND ITS ATTACK
A typical autoencoder consists of two parts, encoder e
which compresses the input into a low dimensional latent
representation, and decoder d which reconstructs the input
from the latent space. Autoencoders and their variations
have been widely applied [19]. There have been many
different encoding and decoding architectures, e.g., sparse
[29], denoising [30], variational [20], [21], Wasserstein [31],
symmetric [32]. In this paper, we focus on VAE and DRAW.
The former is a classical autoencoder framework and the
latter is a newly designed one. We implement double
backpropagation on these two models as a representative
study for their variants.
VAE is a powerful deep generative model, which is effec-
tive in generating data in many complicated distributions.
VAE aims to maximize pθ(x), the distribution to generate x
from latent variables z as follows,
pθ(x) =
∫
pθ(x, z)dz =
∫
pθ(x|z)p(z)dz. (3)
In VAE, an arbitrary distribution could be used in the latent
space. But in practice, the standard Gaussian distribution is
often employed [20], i.e., q(z) = N (0, 1). In VAE training
process, we optimize the following lower bound for pθ(x).
log pθ(x) ≥ Eqφ(z|x)[log pθ(x|z)]−DKL(qφ(z|x)||p(z))
(4)
qφ(z|x) is the encoder part which encodes x into z, and
pθ(x|z) represents decoder which reconstructs x′ from z. θ
and φ are corresponding parameters.
DRAW is a newly proposed structure with a sequential
variational auto-encoding framework that allows for the
iterative construction of complex images. DRAW uses LSTMs
with an attention mechanism and a metaphor of "painting"
3the image in a canvas step by step [19]. The training proce-
dure could be summarized as the following for t = 1, 2, ..., T
xˆt = x− σ(ct−1)
rt = read(xt, xˆt, h
dec
t−1)
henct = RNN
enc(henct−1, [rt, h
dec
t−1])
zt ∼ Q(Zt|henct )
hdect = RNN
dec(hdect−1, zt)
ct = ct−1 + write(hdect ),
(5)
where xˆt denotes the error image, σ is the logistic sigmoid
function, ct represents the canvas matrix, henct denotes the
output of RNNenc, and hdect denotes the output of RNN
dec.
hdect is used to parameterize the distribution Q(Zt|henct ),
with which the parameters of the Gaussian distribution in
the latent can be calculated as follows,
µt = W (h
enc
t )
σt = exp(W (h
enc
t ))
(6)
The total loss L of DRAW can be represented as:
L = −log D(x|cT )
+
1
2
(∑T
t=1
µ2t + σ
2
t − log σ2t
)
− T/2 (7)
Here, cT is the final canvas matrix. The negative log prob-
ability of x under D is −log D(x|cT ), which represents
reconstruction loss and the other loss is for z.
Since the proposal of adversarial attack [14], its design,
defense, and analysis have attracted much attention recently.
Except for a new type of adversarial attack [33], the majority
of the existing adversarial attacks aim at the over-sensitive
part of a neural network such that slight distortions on the
input lead to significant changes on the output.
As discussed previously, the gradients of autoencoders
have not been considered during its training neither, thus the
existence of adversarial examples is not surprising. Here, we
introduce the targeted attack on autoencoders designed by
[19]. It aims to change the input from x0 within a small range
such that the reconstruction output is similar to a target xtar.
Mathematically,
min
∆x
‖∆x‖+ λ‖d(e(x0 + ∆x))− xtar‖. (8)
where λ is a trade-off parameter between the similarity to
the target and the restriction on the change. In some point
of view, the code is more important to an autoencoder and
then the distance is measured in the latent space, i.e.,
min
∆x
‖∆x‖+ λ‖e(x0 + ∆x)− e(xtar)‖. (9)
Notice that the norm here could be any distance measure-
ment, e.g., pixel-wise `2 distance for the image space and
KL-divergence for the latent space.
The robustness of autoencoders against adversarial at-
tacks could be measured by the area under the distor-
tion–distortion curve (AUDDC) defined in [19].
3 AUTOENCODER WITH DOUBLE BACK-
PROPAGATION
For an autoencoder, two similar inputs should share similar
codes ideally, which actually implies that the magnitude of
dx′/dx = dx′/dz · dz/dx should be small. Therefore, we use
double backpropagation scheme to train autoencoders. Con-
cisely, we minimize dx′/dx together with the reconstruction
loss and the latent space loss, i.e.,
arg min
e,d
Lrec(d(e(x)),x) + λ1Llat(e(x))+
λ2||∇xLrec(d(e(x)),x)||22,
(10)
where Lrec stands for the reconstruction loss, Llat for the
latent loss in the latent space. λ1 and λ2 are hyper parameters
specifying the penalty strength. In (10), the autoencoder
could be smooth and imperceptible perturbation of the
input cannot significantly change the latent codes and the
reconstruction output, which greatly improves the robustness
of autoencoders against adversarial attacks.
When training autoencoders, different architectures
should adopt different learning rate and λ2. Large learning
rate and λ2 lead to a divergent reconstruction result. In
controlling proportions of different item, the total loss focuses
on the loss of the reconstruction in the first half of the time
and loss of DBP in the other.
The DBP scheme for training an autoencoder is previously
defined by (10). For a specific model, the structures of e, d, the
loss for reconstruction, and the latent space loss are different.
First, we consider VAE(DBP), which can be represented as:
arg min
φ,θ
− Eqφ(z|x)[log pθ(x|z)] + λ1DKL(qφ(z|x)||p(z))
+ λ2
∥∥∇x − Eqφ(z|x)[log pθ(x|z)]∥∥22 .
(11)
In practice, we simultaneously train the encoder and
the decoder to minimize the (11). The encoder e(·) maps the
input x to a Gaussian distribution with its mean and variance
to be µ(x, φ) and σ(x, φ). Then a latent variable z is sampled
from such Gaussian distribution by the reparameterization
trick [20], which is used for recovery. φ and θ represent the
parameter of encoder and decoder respectively. λ1 and λ2
are the hyper parameters that balance the reconstruction
performance and the magnitude of the gradient. Γ denotes
gradient descent method which is used for updating training
parameters φ and θ. This optimization algorithm is described
in Algorithm 1, where L0 = −Eqφ(z|x)[log pθ(x|z)], L1 =
Algorithm 1 Training VAE with DBP
Input: learning rate, λ1, λ2
epoch← 0
while epoch < 500 do
x← GetMiniTtrainingBatch()
z ∼ N (µ(x, φ), σ(x, φ))
(φ, θ)← (φ, θ) + Γ( ∂∂φ (L0 + λ1 · L1 + λ2 · L2), ∂∂θ (L0
+λ1 · L1 + λ2 · L2))
end while
DKL(qφ(z|x)||p(z)), L2 = ||∇x − Eqφ(z|x)[log pθ(x|z)]||22.
4For DRAW with double back-propagation, the optimiza-
tion objective function becomes
arg min
φ,θ
= −log D(x|cT ) + λ1
(
1
2
(
T∑
t=1
µ2t + σ
2
t − log σ2t
)
−T/2) + λ2‖∇x − log D(x|cT )‖22,
(12)
where λ1 = 1 and
λ2 =
{
0 epoch < TotalEpoch/2
1 epoch > TotalEpoch/2
At each time step t, the encoder maps the input from the
image x, the previous hidden vector hdect−1 and read operation.
Then a latent variable zt is sampled from the Gaussian
distribution N (µ(x, φt), σ(x, φt). The decoder receives zt
and previous hidden vector hdect−1 to get the output h
dec
t
which is added (via a write operation) to canvas matrix ct.
After T steps, the final canvas matrix cT is used to recon-
struct the image. So the reconstruction loss is −log D(x|cT )
and the DBP loss is ||∇x − log D(x|cT )||22. The training
parameters are φ and θ, which are accumulation of φt
and θt at each time step. This optimization algorithm to
train DRAW with DBP is described in Algorithm 2, where
Algorithm 2 Training DRAW with DBP
Input: learning rate, λ1, λ2, T, c0, henc0 , h
dec
0
epoch← 0
while epoch < 500 do
x← GetMiniTtrainingBatch()
while t < T do
xˆt = x− σ(ct−1)
rt = read(xt, xˆt, h
dec
t−1)
henct = RNN
enc(henct−1, [rt, h
dec
t−1])
µt = W (h
enc
t )
σt = exp(W (h
enc
t ))
zt ∼ N (µt(x, φt), σt(x, φt))
hdect = RNN
dec(hdect−1, zt)
ct = ct−1 + write(hdect )
end while
φ = (φ0, φ1, ..., φT ), θ = (θ0, θ1, ..., θT )
(φ, θ)← (φ, θ)+
Γ( ∂∂φ (L0 +λ1 ·L1 +λ2 ·L2), ∂∂θ (L0 +λ1 ·L1 +λ2 ·L2))
end while
L0 = −log D(x|cT ), L1 = 12 (
∑T
t=1 µ
2
t + σ
2
t − log σ2t )− T/2,
and L2 = ||∇x − log D(x|cT )||22.
Adopting DBP in training of autoencoders could certainly
decrease the sensitivity. Here, we give an example in Fig.2 to
illustrate the difference. The top row of it shows examples of
attacking VAE without DBP. Though the input is similar to
the original example, its output is totally different, i.e., very
similar to the target. As explained, this phenomenon results
from very large gradient dx′/dx in the original VAE, which
is 131.874. With DBP, we successfully control the gradients
to 7.356, nearly 1/12 of the original one, while keeping the
reconstruction error similar, which is 2.771 for VAE(NO DBP)
and 2.796 for VAE(DBP). The comparative images could be
found in the bottom row of Fig.2, where the reconstruction
for clean image is quite good and the attack fails. To produce
output similar to target, the input sample transforms to
something like the target already, which goes against the
principle of adversarial attack.
Fig. 2: Attack performance on VAE(NO DBP) and VAE(DBP).
From the original image in the middle of the left column, one
can generate an adversarial example (shown in the top) for
which the reconstruction result (shown in the top of the right
column), is totally different. If we train VAE with DBP, the
reconstruction result for the original image is similar to that
for VAE; see the middle two images in the right column, but
the attack fails, i.e., the adversarial example (the bottom left
image) and its reconstruction result (the bottom right image)
are similar.
4 SMOOTH CLASSIFIER VIA ENCODER WITH DBP
AND GMMS
The idea of "double backpropagation" has been introduced
for a long time but its performance on classification is
far from satisfactory. The basic reason is that the labelling
process changes continuous probabilities p to discrete labels
y, e.g., −1 and +1 in binary classification. And it is not
reasonable to require neural networks that approach the
labels to have small gradients. In this paper, we propose
to train autoencoder with double backpropagation which
ensures dz/dx to be small and meaningful. Therefore, to
establish a smooth classifier f , one should first recover the
probability to make the other part df/dz to be reasonable,
for which the recently proposed idea, label smoothing, [27]
may help. For example, soft labels acquired by a distillation
mechanism [26] could improve the robustness of model
by re-training [34]. Label smoothing also has remarkable
advantages for obtaining good within-class distributions,
e.g., [24], [28]. The above label smoothing methods only
focus on changing the discrete label to distribution to make
the df/dx more meaningful. However, we can utilize the
smooth encoder to compress the input to a low dimensional
space to make the label smoothing process simpler.
In this paper, we model the latent space Z by Gaussian
Mixture Models (GMM) to learn distribution instead of
discrete labels. The idea of establishing GMM in the latent has
been proposed in clustering [35], [36] and novel detection
[37]. With GMMs in a latent space, we could keep df/dz
5small and reasonable. Furthermore, df/dx = df/dz · dz/dx
is smooth and meaningful with smooth encoder, so we obtain
a classifier expected to be robust.
Suppose there are N classes in a classification problem.
We establish N GMMs in z to fit them. For the ith GMMs,
the distribution of z can be represented as:
pi(z|pii,µi,Σi) =
K∑
j=1
piijN (z|µij ,Σij) (13)
pii, µi, Σi are parameters of ith class. K is the number of
components of every GMM. piij denotes jth component’s
prior probability in ith GMM. Similarly, µij is mean vector
and Σij is covariance matrix. Suppose the dataset of ith
class is Xi = {xi1,xi2, ...,xiMi}. We first train an autoen-
coder with double backpropagation, and then the encoder
compresses Xi to Zi = {zi1, zi2, ..., ziMi} in the latent. Then
Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm [38] is adopted
to estimate the parameters in every GMM including prior
probability piij , mean vector µij and covariance matrix Σij
based on Zi.
After learning parameters of GMM, the probability den-
sity value belonging to every class can be calculated for any
point in latent space. We concatenating and normalize them
to get the probability that the point belongs to each class,
which we regard as the output of a classifier.
g(z) = [p′1(z), p
′
2(z). . . p
′
N (z)], p
′
i(z) ∈ [0, 1],
N∑
i=1
p′i = 1
(14)
Combining the encoder part and the GMM part, we get the
smooth classifier f(x) = g(e(x)). So, the transformation
between two classes can be implemented by running several
iterations of the following equations.
xnew = x− η · sign(5x ‖ ftarget − f(x) ‖2) (15)
where ftarget is the target output and η denotes the step size.
As shown in the following transformation, new examples
are generated based on gradient as same to the adversarial
attack. However, instead of obtaining noisy images with
incorrect label, we successfully transfer the image, the
probability, and the label jointly, from "9" to "7". Figure 3
illustrates the images and the probabilities.
Transformation and adversarial attacks do not co-exist.
The success of transformation implies the robustness of
the established GMM. Therefore, the classifier we obtained
by GMM estimation and smooth encoder is relatively ro-
bust to adversarial attacks. Gaussian mixture variational
autoencoder [39] is similar to our model in the structure.
Nevertheless, this defense method does not maintain a good
reconstruction result. Furthermore, it also fails in white
box when the hyper parameter that trades off between
reconstruction fidelity and latent space prior changes.
5 EXPERIMENT
As previous discussed, training autoencoder with DBP could
restrict the magnitude of the gradient so that improve the
performance against adversarial examples. In this section,
we validate the robustness of proposed method by securing
Fig. 3: By modeling a GMM over an autoencoder with DBP,
one can obtain a smooth classifier such that changing the
image in the gradient direction could really transfer the
image from "9" and "7", which also means that adversarial
attack in gradient direction fails. The bottom plots the smooth
change of the probabilities of "9" and "7".
autoencoder against adversarial attack. First, we train au-
toencoder with DBP and validate that it improves robustness
against adversarial examples greatly comparing the autoen-
coder without DBP on MNIST and CelebA dataset. The
autoencoders we use are VAE and DRAW, where adopting
"double backpropagation" method makes a difference in
defending. After that, we train an autoencoder with DBP
and build GMMs in latent space to obtain robust classifier
on MNIST and SVHN. Then we validate its transferability
and robustness against white and black attack.
5.1 Reconstruction Performance
The autoencoders we choose to research are VAE and the
DRAW without and with its attention mechanism. For
autoencoders’ structure, we adopt the models in [19]. The
details about the models and their implementation are given
in the supplemental materials.
Table 1 shows that "double back propagation" restricts the
magnitude of gradient dx′/dx, most of which reaches nearly
1/100 of the original one. At the same time, the quality of
reconstruction does not decrease too much. In Fig. 4, we
show reconstruction results of AE(DBP) and AE(NO DBP)
on MNIST and CelebA for the qualitative analysis. For each
pair, the left image is an example from MNIST and the right
one is from CelebA.
Fig. 4: Reconstruction results of DRAW without and with
DBP trained on MNIST and CelebA. The left column shows
two original images and the reconstruction results are given
in the right, indicating that DBP only slightly discards the
reconstruction performance.
6TABLE 1: Reconstruction loss and magnitude of gradient(l2 norm) for all autoencoders of different architecture with and
without double back-propagation on MNIST and CelebA.
VAE DRAW1 DRAW16 DRAW16(attention)
DBP NO DBP DBP NO DBP DBP NO DBP DBP NO DBP
Reconstruction Loss MNIST 0.238 0.319 0.259 0.297 0.174 0.237 0.133 0.168CelebA 2.771 2.796 3.017 3.068 2.612 2.561 1.875 1.813
Magnitude of Gradient MNIST 9.535 0.051 6.732 0.041 10.056 0.045 10.657 0.023CelebA 133.274 7.541 579.255 10.057 652.772 2.660 1061.100 13.992
5.2 Robustness of VAE with DBP
In the previous part, we show that applying DBP in the
autoencoder can restrict the amplitude of dx′/dx signifi-
cantly without decreasing the reconstruction performance.
Naturally, we expect that the smoother autoencoder could
improve the resistance to adversarial attack. So in this part,
we evaluate the robustness of VAE with DBP comparing with
VAE without DBP. We achieve targeted attack both on the
latent space and output space.
Here AUDDC is used to evaluate the robustness of
autoencoders. The details about calculating the AUDDC are
provided in supplemental material. Table 2 shows VAE(NO
DBP) and VAE(DBP) performance on adversarial attacks. The
AUDDC of VAE(DBP) is much larger than that of VAE(NO
DBP), which means applying double back-propagation in
VAE successfully improves the robustness against adversarial
examples. Then we visually analyzed the attack results for
VAE(DBP) and VAE(NO DBP) on each dataset. Fig. 5 shows
the attack on MNIST and CelebA dataset respectively. For
MNIST, when attacking VAE(NO DBP), the adversarial exam-
ples are generated by adding imperceptible perturbations on
the original image, leading the output to change to something
similar to the target. The adversarial examples of VAE(DBP)
are always similar to the target, which means the restriction
of the gradient dx′/dx improves the resistance of the VAE to
attack. For CelebA, when the reconstruction results approach
the target, the adversarial examples of VAE(NO DBP) are
noisy image but they are similar to target in VAE(DBP).
5.3 Robustness of DRAW with DBP
In this part, we evaluate the robustness of DRAW(DBP)
and DRAW(NO DBP) on MNIST and CelebA dataset. The
architectures of DRAW are different in attention window,
time steps, size of latent and the LSTM. We achieve targeted
attack both on the latent space and output space.
Table 2 illustrates the performance of these autoen-
coders against adversarial attacks. The AUDDCs of different
DRAWs(DBP) are much higher than that of DRAW(NO DBP),
which means for autoencoders with more complex archi-
tecture such as DRAW, applying double back-propagation
can also strengthen the resistance against adversarial ex-
amples. In Fig. 5, we show some examples of the attack.
Imperceptible additive perturbations on the input image
fool the DRAW(NO DBP) to generate something similar to
the target. However, adversarial examples can only fool the
DRAW(DBP) when they actually look like the target.
5.4 Image Transition based on GMM
The above experiments validate the robustness of equipping
double backpropagation on VAE and DRAW. As previously
Fig. 5: Robustness of autoencoder against attacks. The top
shows the attack process: a. the original image; b. the
target image; c. adversarial example of autoencoder without
DBP; d. adversarial example of autoencoder with DBP; e.
reconstruction result when there is no DBP; f. reconstruc-
tion result when there is DBP. The left column indicates
the specific autoencoder (VAE/DRAW) and the dataset
(MNIST/CelebA). With additionally considering DBP, the
robustness of autoencoders is visually enhanced such that
unless the adversarial example is very similar to the target,
the reconstruction result can not approach the target image.
discussed, training AE(DBP) can control the magnitude
of dz/dx. We build GMMs in the latent space to make
df/dz meaningful, so as for df/dx. Then we validate its
transferability and robustness against while and black attack.
In this part, we consider the dataset MNIST and SVHN. The
networks we choose to generate adversarial examples are a
simple MLP, LeNet [22] and designed convolutional network
CvNet. Attack methods are FGSM and PGD. The details
about the networks are provided in supplemental material.
For MNIST dataset, we experiment with two classifiers
f1, f2 for demonstration of DBP. f1 combines the autoencoder
trained without DBP and with GMM. f2 applies DBP on
the autoencoder whose λ1 and λ2 in (10) are both 1. We
then build GMM in the latent space for classification. Four
examples of transition in the input space are shown in Figure
6. During the transition, the confidence increases gradually.
Transition in the input space of f1 is shown in the left of
Figure 6. The confidence increases and output of decoder
transforms to the target gradually, but the input just has
7TABLE 2: AUDDC for DRAW different structure with and without DBP on MNIST and CelebA. Higher values indicate
higher resistance to the attacks.
VAE DRAW1 DRAW16 DRAW16(attention)
DBP NO DBP DBP NO DBP DBP NO DBP DBP NO DBP
Alatent
MNIST 0.304 0.55 0.264 0.529 0.409 0.614 0.693 0.801
CelebA 0.329 0.429 0.453 0.578 0.858 0.865 0.934 0.946
Aoutput
MNIST 0.277 0.447 0.239 0.402 0.143 0.323 0.361 0.605
CelebA 0.238 0.369 0.342 0.485 0.198 0.319 0.232 0.310
Fig. 6: Image transition performance with and without DBP.
In each of the four groups, we transfer the images by
searching on the gradient direction of the classifier. The
first line is the reconstruction result of the autoencoder and
the second line is the input.
TABLE 3: Accuracies of the Encoder(DBP)+GMM, MLP,
LeNet and CvNet for the white box examples on MNIST
and SVHN.
MNIST SVHN
Encoder(D
BP)+GMM MLP LeNet
Encoder(D
BP)+GMM CvNet
FGSM 94.83% 19.03% 91.48% 80.0% 58.9%
PGD 93.56% 8.12% 56.64% 72.6% 1.8%
some noise and does not change to the target. Then we
implement transition in the input space of f2 . The results
are visualized in the right of Figure 6. The input changes
greatly and shows some apparent features of the target as the
confidence changing for the reason that the GMM is smooth
and the magnitude of dz/dx is restricted.
So transformation in the input space can only be realized
when both the GMMs and encoder are smooth. However, the
input images are still fuzzy and hard to recognize because
the GMM does not reach high accuracy and encoder part is
not smooth enough. GMM may provide the wrong gradient
direction which leads the input change to fuzzy one.
As previous discussed, transformation and adversarial
attacks do not co-exist. To validate this, we analyze the
performance of the classifier we design against white and
black box examples. For MNIST, MLP and LeNet are used to
generate black box examples [4] where the accuracy of MLP
is 97.84% and LeNet is 99.37%. The classifier with encoder
and GMMs reaches 95.28% accuracy rate. For SVHN, we
train CvNet to generate specific adversarial examples which
reaches 91.14% accuracy rate. The classifier consisting of
encoder and GMM reaches 83.8% accuracy. Table 3 illustrates
the performance of classifiers against white attack. We find
that the classifiers combining smooth encoder and GMM
shows robustness against the FGSM and PGD attack while
the MLP, LeNet and CvNet can be easily attacked. The
classifiers combining smooth encoder and GMM can also
defend the adversarial black box attack which is illustrated
in Table 4.
TABLE 4: Accuracies of the Encoder(DBP)+GMM for the
black box examples on MNIST and SVHN. The adversarial
examples are generated by MLP, LeNet and CvNet.
MNIST SVHN
MLP LeNet CvNet
FGSM 93.33% 92.32% 82.0%
PGD 92.93% 88.77% 73.0%
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we are the first to propose to secure autoen-
coder such as VAE and DRAW with double backpropagation.
It is shown that adversarial attack towards an autoencoder
trained with DBP will fail and produce sample similar to
the target image. Accordingly, autoencoders with DBP are
much more robust without loss of reconstruction reality.
Furthermore, we obtain a robust and accurate classifier
by modeling the distribution of latent vectors in robust
autoencoder by GMM. Our research shows that smoothing
the gradient and label contributes to defense of adversarial
attack.
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